On St. Anselm's Proslogion:
Fides Quaerens Lucem Inaccessibilis
"You are wholly present, and yet I cannot come into your presence. How am I to approach an inaccessible light?"
-St. Anselm of Canterbury
The present writing is an attempt to preserve what has now become commonly ignored. It is an attempt to properly allow the words of an 11th century thinker to take their stand. Throughout the many centuries, numerous interpretations of St. Anselm's Proslogion have been articulated, but very few have properly allowed his 'work' to speak openly about its true meaning. The following paper will attempt to achieve such a challenging feat. It will attempt to enter into, the domain of thought which Anselm encountered in his thinking.
But how? How is it possible to achieve such a feat from a 21st century perspective? With such an enormous divide between thoughts, how is such an attempt even possible?
The present author by no means claims a privileged standpoint. The precise thoughts of a skilled 11th century theologian are perhaps too elusive a task. However, something decisive seems to have occurred. Throughout many textbooks and commentaries, the thoughts of St. Anselm have been reduced to the formalities of an 'argument'. Whether reduced to Kripkean logic, or neglectfully absent of key passages, many 're-constructions' today fail to capture the heart of Anselm's own thinking.
What these varying 're-constructions' seem to share is a remarkable inability to recognize the precision of Anselm's own writing. He was a thinker who, demonstrably, wrote with an outstanding exactitude. In his early works (De Veritate and De Libertate), Anselm presented forthright definitions of varying philosophical issues such as 'truth', 'justice' and 'freedom'. And this exactitude of definition maintained itself with perfect clarity all the way through until his latest of writings (De Concordia), where he then explicitly used the very same straightforward definitions. In his published writings, Anselm never felt the need to re-fashion his 'work'. This exactitude demonstrates a thinker cognizant of his ability to translate the force of his convictions in his written words.
But most commentaries neglect this. They seem to neglect the full breadth of Anselm's exacting capabilities. And in so doing, have neglected what Anselm himself considered to be of significance. They have drained the heart of Anselm's own motivations.
Even today, the most sympathetic of Anselm supporters are guilty of these crimes. In speaking of Anselm's Proslogion in his two essays: "What did Anselm Discover?" and "The Irreducibly Modal Structure of the Argument", one would scarcely recognize Charles Hartshorne to be speaking of something Anselm had actually written. Although his work possesses marvelous 'logical' insights about Anselm's thoughts, he seems to somehow ignore the fact that Anselm's intention wasn't to convince a bunch of modal logicians about God's existence. It is this kind of misguided oversight which has led him, and others, to arrive at varying construed conclusions about Anselm's own work. For example, although within the Proslogion Anselm never references 'two-arguments', Hartshorne arrives at such an awkward contention based on his reading. Consider:
Anselm made two principal attempts to formulate his insight...The first of the two formulations (ProslogionII) is now generally admitted to be a failure. But the second formulation (Proslogion III) is very different, and logically irreducible to the first and - although Anselm seems somewhat unclear about this - independent of it. (Hartshorne, in The Many Faced, 124)
What is remarkable about such a commentary isn't the fact that Hartshorne doesn't appreciate Anselm's own precise standpoint, but rather the fact that many commentators today have followed this lead. They have followed this 'two-argument' lead, curiously claiming the authority of Anselm. But Anselm says nothing anywhere about 'two arguments'. It is not as though Anselm was somehow "unclear" about this point, Anselm was instead very clear in his own right. What does remain unclear however, is how it is possible that acknowledged leading Anselmian commentators have managed to re-arrange Anselm's thoughts in order to fit into their own particular agendas.
Textbook anthologies today seem to have enjoyed this type of lead as well. And in so doing, have fallen into the tendency to presuppose that only particular aspects of Anselm's work contribute to a proper understanding of Anselm's true meaning. But this sort of tendency neglects the force of Anselm's own convictions. It neglects what Anselm's thinking did in investing the proper time to realize the fullness of his thinking in words. That is, does it even make sense to properly claim to have understood Anselm based on a 'minimized' portion of his text? Or what is more, is it even intelligible to claim that somehow Anselm was "unclear" about what he himself wrote down?
These types of considerations may lead one to believe, that if Anselm were in fact around today, he would most likely be quite confused by the sorts of attributions and appropriations made under the authority of his name. His thoughts have become contrived, and detached from the line of thinking which his text, the Proslogion, attempted to set forth.
It is from this sort of concern that the following paper will take its lead. It will concern itself with preserving the thoughts Anselm wrote down in his Proslogion. Its task however, won't be to directly engage itself with the failings of contemporary commentaries, but rather to detail a faithful reading of Anselm's own written work. It will be an attempt to go back into the Proslogion, in order to uncover what exactly it was that Anselm's thinking was attempting to do. And in so doing, it will try to avoid the seemingly popular temptation to import an external theory or criterion upon Anselm's own thoughts.
Although such a task is indeed problematical due to the enormous divided amongst thought-domains (over 900 years), this decisive neglect of contemporary commentaries has demanded that Anselm's thoughts be preserved. The deep penetration Anselm invested in his thinking has made it such that, the reciprocal should be asked of his readers.
So how is such a feat to be achieved? The strategy of this paper will be to try and outline the 'logic' of Anselm's text. It will try to do so, by closely reading the intricate subtleties by which Anselm's thought attempts to move. By following the steps of his thought, as they present themselves within the Proslogion, a deeper understanding of Anselm's true meaning should begin to reveal itself.
It should be noted however, that this paper is but a small step in the attempt to preserve and acknowledge the thoughts of St. Anselm's Proslogion. Let any reader of this paper find provocation for any further step. Dialogue is living in character, and it is only in and through the expression of this nature that anyone's thinking can hope to be kept alive.
Proslogion
Preface (Prooemium)
Anselm's title, the Proslogion, bears significance to a proper understanding of the intentions of his thinking. However the signaling of this significance is not referred to by Anselm until the latter end of this opening Preface. To begin with then, consider only the first half of the long opening sentence which announces the beginning of this Preface:
After I had published, at the urging of some of my brethren, a short work as a pattern for meditation on the rational basis of faith, adopting the role of someone who, by reasoning silently to himself, investigates into things he does not know, I began to wonder... (Anselm, Schufrieder's transl., 313)
Anselm is referring to here, the Monologion, is an earlier piece of writing which Anselm had published roughly a year prior. In that work, Anselm entreated his reader to an extended bit of reasoning which was arrived at in a meditation upon the nature of faith.
However, the significance of this opening line lies in the acknowledgement Anselm makes to the authentic starting point of his thinking. Although very commonly overlooked by commentators, Anselm is admitting that his thinking in the Proslogion was provoked and occasioned by a 'wonder'.
This acknowledgement of 'wonder', as a catalyst for philosophical thinking, was presaged early on in the developmental stages of Western thinking. Consider Plato's use of the Socratic character to identify this insight in his dialogue, the Theaetetus:
THEAET. Oh yes, indeed, Socrates, I often wonder like mad what these things can mean.
SOC. I dare say you do, my dear boy. For this is an experience characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else. (Plato, Burnyeat's transl., 277)
What the Socratic character identifies here, is that a proper introduction to philosophical thinking lies not in the precise claim made by a philosopher, but that it rather begins with the 'wonder' which occasions the philosopher to think in the way that they do. That is, philosophical thinking is always preceded by a 'wonder' which allows for the possibility of a philosophical claim to be made.
Anselm admits this insight in his opening line. He acknowledges the fact that his thinking began with a 'wonder'. Without this 'wonder', the open path for his thinking could not have been traveled - its gates would have remained shut. The whole domain of Anselm's thinking begins then, with an understanding of what the nature of this 'wondering' was.
So the question now becomes: what was it that Anselm was 'wondering' about? Consider further:
...I began to wonder, when I considered that it [the Monologion] is constructed out of a chaining together of many arguments, whether it might be possible to find a single argument that needed nothing but itself alone for proof, that would by itself be enough to show that God really exists; that he is the supreme good, who depends on nothing else, but on whom all things depend for their being and for their well-being; and whatever we believe about the divine nature. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 313)
The stage for Anselm's 'wondering', consisted in its consideration of the possibility of uncovering a "single argument" (unum argumentum), which, by itself, could reveal the true being of God. Namely, Anselm not only 'wondered' about his capability to demonstrate that God's being was real (its 'that-ness'), but he also 'wondered' about whether or not this unum argumentum could unfold what God's nature might be (its 'what-ness').
What is curiously unnoticed by many (if not all) commentators, however, is that this is the only sentence in the whole of the Proslogion whereby Anselm makes reference to the word "argument" (argumentum). And at this early stage, what has he referenced it in regards to? Seemingly, all he has done at this early stage, is identify the nature of his 'wondering'. He has not, contrary to what almost every interpreter has claimed, established that the Proslogion is an exposition of a 'single argument'. Rather, all he has done at this initial stage is identify that this was the nature of his 'wonder'. He acknowledges that he 'wondered' about the possibility of whether a 'single argument' could demonstrate the being of God (its essence and existence).
Although many commentators may interject here, and suggest instead that Anselm is identifying that the Proslogion is an exposition of a "single argument", the question remains for this interpreter: wherein has Anselm claimed that the Proslogion is a single argument for God's being? He certainly cannot be said to have done it here. All he has done at this stage of the Proslogion is establish the domain of thought by which he is thinking in. He is claiming to have entered into a domain which 'wondered' about such things as 'single arguments' for God's being. This is the domain of thought which occasioned the Proslogion, but is not the Proslogion itself. As will be seen later on in this paper, the Proslogion itself is much closer to a prayer relationship which attempts to 'understand' the referent of its prayer.
Having acknowledged then, that his thinking began with a 'wondering' about the possibility of a "single argument" for the being of God, Anselm continues in his Preface with an expression of the process his thinking went through:
And so I often turned my thoughts to this with great diligence. Sometimes I thought I could already grasp what I was looking for, and sometimes it escaped my mind completely. Finally, I gave up hope. I decided to stop looking for something that was impossible to find. But when I tried to stifle that thought altogether, lest by occupying my mind with useless speculation it should keep me from things I could actually accomplish, it began to hound me more and more, although I resisted and fought against it. Then one day, when my violent struggle against its hounding had worn me down, the thing I had despaired presented itself in the very clash of my thoughts, so that I eagerly embraced the thought I had been taking such pains to drive away. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 313)
This lengthy passage gives Anselm's reader a rather dramatic re-telling of the series of events his thinking had gone through. Quite curiously, Anselm describes his encounter as a "violent struggle" which had "hounded" against him.
According to one of Anselm's disciples (named Eadmer), during the few days before Anselm's thinking had finally achieved its "embrace", Anselm's behavior in his monastery had been rather peculiar. Eadmer had written two accounts of Anselm's life, De Vita et Conversatione Anselmi Archiescopi Cantuariensis (which is mainly concerned with Anselm's private life), and Historia Novorum (which is an account of Anselm's public career as Archbishop of Canterbury). In the former writing, Eadmer relates the fact that prior to Anselm's 'revelation' of God's being, Anselm had given up on "food, drink and sleep". The force of Anselm's thinking had made it such that, according to Eadmer, Anselm was in a state 'paralyzed terror'. Eadmer recounts that Anselm was so exercised by his thinking, that since it was keeping him from his 'churchly' duties, he began to believe that his whole pursuit was perhaps a temptation from the Devil.
And accordingly, as Anselm re-tells in his Preface, he had to stop this thinking - "I decided to stop looking for something that was impossible to find". His 'turning' towards its possibility in 'wonderment' ("so I often turned my thoughts to this with great diligence"), had led Anselm to 'turn' back towards what was ready-at-hand - "lest by occupying my mind with useless speculation it should keep me from things I could actually accomplish". But in heading back towards his duties, something remained in his thinking. He began to realize that after having 'turned' back, his thinking had taken him to a new standpoint - "one day, when my violent struggle against its hounding had worn me down, the thing I had despaired of finding presented itself in the very clash of my thoughts". Anselm, upon his 're-turn', remarks that in following the path of his thinking, which was spurned by a 'wonder', a new vantage point had been achieved in his thinking - "so that I eagerly embraced the thought I had been taking such pains to drive away".
With this description of his process of thought movement, one can't help but recognize an interesting parallel with the Platonic description of thought movement in the Allegory of the Cave. Sparing great details, and speaking very briefly, Anselm's description of the process of his thinking could be said to parallel, a leaving of the 'every-dayness' of the cave, in order to 'turn' towards the "supreme good". Consider in fact, his following sentence:
Therefore, thinking that what I had rejoiced to discover would please a reader if it were written down, I wrote about it and a number of other things in the work that follows, adopting the role of someone trying to raise his mind to the contemplation of God and seeking to understand what he believes. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 313)
To continue very briefly with this Platonic parallel, Anselm appears to be announcing here, that he has 're-turned' back to the cave. He has grasped what is outside of the cave, and has decided to give an account of that moment.
It is also the first identification Anselm makes about his intentions in the Proslogion. In writing down the results of his "discovery", Anselm identifies the role of the Proslogion to be a work for those "trying to raise their mind to the contemplation of God and seeking to understand what they believe." It is from this standpoint that Anselm claims the Proslogion is written. It is not from the standpoint of one claiming a "single argument" for the existence of God it is rather from the standpoint of one trying to elevate their thinking towards the heavens, in order to understand what is already believed. In identifying this intent of his work, Anselm has also signaled a privileged shift in his understanding. He has identified that his 're-turn' to the cave might "please a reader if it were written down". In his contemplation of the being of God, Anselm's understanding of God's being had occasioned a shift. A transition has occurred, whereby Anselm's thinking about God's being had provoked a metamorphosis in his understanding. In suggesting that it 'would please a reader were it written down', Anselm appears to be announcing that a fundamental transformation in the thought of God's being has occurred in his understanding. Since his thinking was concerned with the being of God, something transitional in his thinking must have occurred.
A second announcement is also being signaled in this passage. Anselm has signaled a peculiarity that his thinking admits for. He claims that it is a work for those "trying to raise their mind to the contemplation of God." He doesn't say that it is a work for just any sort of thinking. But rather, he claims it to be for a rather specific audience. It is a writing, then, which demands of its reader a specific sort of thinking. A thinking which is trying to understand what it believes.
To this point in the Preface then, Anselm has pointed his reader towards the following points regarding the Proslogion: He has signaled that for him, the Proslogion was occasioned by a 'wondering' about a "single argument" which could demonstrate the being of God. According to Anselm, this 'wonder' led him towards a traumatic 'struggle' whereby his thinking turned away from the ready-at-hand, and towards the ethereal. Frustrated in his struggle however, Anselm's thinking had to 're-turn' back. But in 're-turning' back, it recognized the presence of a newfound understanding. Anselm claims to have written down this newfound understanding in the Proslogion, but he advises his reader that it is written from the standpoint of a specific sort of thinking, viz. a thinking from the standpoint of one which seeks to understand what one believes.
Consider now the concluding sentences of this opening Preface:
Since I had judged that neither this work nor the one I mentioned earlier deserved to be called a book, or to bear the name of an author, and yet I did not think they ought to be sent out with so much as a title by which they might induce someone who came across them to read them, I gave each a title. The first I called 'A pattern for meditation on the rational basis of faith'; the second I called 'Faith seeking understanding.' But since both works had been transcribed under these titles by several readers, I was encouraged by a number of people (especially by Hugo, the Most Reverend Archbishop of Lyons, Apostolic Legate to France, who commanded me by his apostolic authority) to put my own name on these works. And so, in order to do so more suitably, I named the first Monologion, which means a speech made to oneself, and the second Proslogion, which means a speech made to another. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 313)
There are two significant points worth mentioning here before going on to chapter 1 of this work. Both points are curious, and unfortunately, the second point appears mired in an ambiguity of sorts.
As for the first point, although commonly ignored, some thinkers have pointed out the rather curious dilemma Anselm's thinking had faced. Anselm appears to be somewhat anxious by the fact that, in writing his thoughts down, he may lose control over them. This is a dilemma some contemporary thinkers claim is characteristic of a problem within the Western philosophical project; namely, the relationship between thinking, speech, and its written word.
Anselm explains that initially, he felt no need to signify or title his work: "I had judged that neither this work nor the one I mentioned earlier [Monologion] deserved to be called a book, or to bear the name of an author". However, Anselm did feel the need to entice a potential reader towards the "pleasure" his thoughts had brought him: "yet I did not think they ought to be sent out without so much as a title by which they might induce someone who came across them to read them, I gave each a title". The initial title he indeed gave to the Proslogion was "Faith Seeking Understanding" (fides quaerens intellectum). [Suitably titled for the specificity of thinking Anselm had announced earlier on in this Preface.]
But something refrained Anselm from merely doing so. Something occasioned Anselm, to refrain from simply allowing his words to signify without an author or determinate title. Why? Anselm explains: "But since both works had been transcribed under these titles by several readers." What happened was that Anselm's written word began to circulate a bit too freely. The control, the paternal rights of his thoughts, began to run wildly. This posed a threat to the integrity Anselm invested into his thinking. In order to settle down this promiscuity, Anselm reasserted his control by determinately associating these words with his name and a proper title: "[I]...put my own name on these works. And so, in order to do so more suitably, I named the first Monologion, which means a speech made to oneself, and the second Proslogion, which means speech made to another." In so doing, Anselm appears to have attempted to satisfy the determinacy of his thinking. The intimate thinking which he had in his 'wonder', has now reasserted itself as his own.
The significance of this curiosity is to try and point out the state of Anselm's thinking within his Proslogion. Not only does he describe a "violent struggle" in his thinking, but he also gestures towards the problematic he faced in deciding to write his thoughts down. His thinking was intimate to him. He didn't want it to be taken the wrong way. He wanted to share it, but he didn't want to lose it. He wanted to maintain the possession of the unique encounter his thinking had faced.
A second point worth considering in this above passage is the explanation Anselm gives to the title of his work. In titling it, Anselm manifests an improper Latin word by conjoining pro (toward) with logion (speech). The curiosity for the reader arrives however, when the reader questions: 'who is this speech directed towards, and by whom?'. Is it the 'reader'? Is it to Anselm's 'brethren' at the monastery? Is it to 'God'? Or is it maybe an address by God to 'Anselm'? Although some commentators have moved quickly over this reference, and associated it with a speech between 'Anselm' and his 'reader', such a move requires much assumption. At this stage of the Proslogion, it remains ambiguous, who and by whom, Anselm has in mind since Anselm has failed to make determinate the direction, and the relationship, of this speech. Perhaps a closer look at the later moments of this work will hope to reveal the essence of the ambiguity of this title.
With the Preface now complete, Anselm is prepared to move towards the 'logic' of this work. He has made his intentions clear - the Proslogion is a specific sort of thinking which seeks to understand what it believes. This seeking was occasioned for Anselm, by a 'wonder' which contemplated the possibility of a 'single argument' for God's being. Anselm has identified that the process of this thinking involved much 'struggle', but that in its end, a 'pleasure' is to be 'embraced'. Anselm must now move to demonstrate in the ensuing chapters how it is that such a privileged thinking of God's being can be achieved.
Chapter 1 - A Rousing of the Mind to the Contemplation of God
Chapter 1 of the Proslogion, although generally 'minimized' in many textbook anthologies, plays an essential role to the 'logic' of Anselm's demonstration. Even largely sympathetic interpretations have fallen prey to the shortcoming of neglecting the importance of this opening chapter. What is commonly overlooked is the strategic role this chapter plays for Anselm's demonstration.
Functionally speaking, Anselm's written attempt in this chapter plays an integral role in the strategic development of the logic of the Proslogion. Recall, the domain of thought Anselm is thinking in, is specific to, the particular 'wondering' which occasioned its opening to be thought. What he must do then is somehow find a way to draw his reader into such a domain. He must find a way to 'turn' his reader towards the type of thinking which had presented itself to him.
So how does Anselm achieve this? In order to accomplish such a feat, Anselm accesses a particular type of writing tool - he writes a poem. His strategy here is to entice the mind, and to 'turn' it towards the direction of thought Anselm himself had encountered. As the title of chapter 1 identifies ('A Rousing of the Mind to the Contemplation of God'), Anselm is concerned with inducing his reader into the company of his thoughts. Anselm appears to have recognized that the possibility of his domain of thinking had only opened up via a specific sort of antecedent. Thus, he felt the need to break down the walls which may have sheltered this domain. The opening moments of the Proslogion (chp. 1) represents this attempt.
So how does this strategy work? Anselm begins his attempt by calling his reader forth:
Come now, little man. Leave behind your concerns for a little while, and retreat for a short time from your restless thoughts. Cast off your burdens and cares; set aside your labor and toil. Just for a little while make room for God, and rest a while in him. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 315)
Anselm is signaling a thinking which turns away from the ready-at-hand. It is a momentary thinking which casts its glance towards the ethereal. A thinking which considers a specific territory of thought - the thought of God's being.
Anselm then further re-iterates the specificity of this thinking by appealing to biblical verses which reinforces his particularized domain of thinking:
'Enter into the chamber' (Matthew 6:6) of your mind, shut out everything but God and whatever else helps you to seek him. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 315)
But why? Why is one turning away from the readily accessible towards such celestial thoughts? Anselm continues these opening moments by signaling the intent of this thinking:
Speak now...say to God, 'I seek your face, Lord, it is your face that I seek' (Psalm 27: 8).
This sentence concludes the opening section of chapter 1. It is an identification of the thinking which tries to seek the being of God. However, in the second section of chapter1, Anselm reverses the priority in this search. Consider:
Come now, O Lord my God. Teach my heart where and how to seek you, where and how to find you. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 315)
In this line, Anselm appears to be calling forth God in the seeking of God's being. It is a calling out for the aid of God in the contemplation of him. The thinking which Anselm is announcing here, is not only a thinking concerned with the being of God, but also a thinking which calls out for the presencing aid of God. Why must it do so? Anselm next gives his reader an explanation for why this sort of thinking is necessary. He tells his reader a story. His gives an account for why there is a difficulty in comprehending God without his aid:
Lord...if you are everywhere, why do I not see you?...I was created so that I may see you, but I have not yet done what I was created to do. How terrible human beings are! They have lost the very thing for which they were created. Hard and terrible was their fall!...Alas for the common lamentation of human beings, the universal outcry of the children of Adam! He was satisfied to the full; we sigh with hunger...Why did [Adam] shut us out from the light and cover us with darkness?...From our homeland into exile; from the vision of God into our blindness; from the joy of immortality into the bitterness and terror of death. (Anselm, Schufrieder's transl., 315)
The story Anselm is telling here is the story of original sin. This is the story Anselm believes will explain to his reader the difficulty in properly conceiving of God's being. It is this story then, which demands the thinking of the presencing aid of God. That is, this thinking is necessary, because the blinding of God was occasioned by the fall of man.
Having now announced a particular thinking which desires the aid of God, Anselm continues with the theme of 'arousing' the mind. He has identified why this thinking is difficult, and so he now continues with this 'excitation programme' (excita mentem).
Of particular notice, is a theme Anselm introduces to his reader in chapter 1, and then re-iterates later on throughout the Proslogion. The theme is a metaphorical reference, which is provided in order to aid the reader during the journey of their thought. It is the metaphor of an "inaccessible light". Drawing from the book of Timothy, Anselm provokes his reader by asking them to consider its task as approaching an 'inaccessible light':
Surely you dwell in an inaccessible light!
But where is this inaccessible light,
and how can I approach such an inaccessible light?
(Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 321)
The metaphor is quite fitting for Anselm's attempt in the Proslogion. Anselm recognizes God as his light - this is why he calls forth God's presencing aid. But at the same time, it is searching for an understanding of this light. Why? Because the light's dwelling has become inaccessible - its light has become shrouded in darkness. Anselm is entreating his reader to a seeking which believes in this light, and desires to understand it by attempting to bring it out of its hidden state.
What remains terribly peculiar about this thinking however, is that Anselm remains steadfast in his desire to use this 'light' in order to understand the 'light'. In the concluding moments of this opening chapter, Anselm reinforces this desire:
Raise me so that I can turn my gaze upwards. Let me look at your light...Teach me how to seek you, and show yourself to me when I seek. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 321)
Anselm is calling forth a thinking which thinks of God's being, but asks for God's assistance in the process. But the question must arise once again: 'why?' Why is God's assistance desired in the thinking of his being? Anselm addresses this questioning as such:
For I cannot seek you unless you show me how, and I cannot find you unless you show yourself to me. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 323)
This passage demonstrates that Anselm's faith in God is stronger than any proof could ever establish. It is stronger for Anselm, because his understanding is preceded by faith, thus, without it, there can be no understanding. It is not as though he thinks of his belief as a failure requiring epistemic backing. Rather, his belief is the source for all of his understanding to occur:
For I do not seek to understand in order to believe; I believe in order to understand. For I also believe that unless I believe, I shall not understand. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 323)
The peculiarity of Anselm's thinking is that he wants to understand the source of his understanding. He wants to make sense of the very thing which allows him to make sense of every other thing:
I do long to understand your truth in some way, your truth which my heart believes and loves." (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 323)
God's being, as the source of every criterion of Anselm's judgment, is not in question during Anselm's demonstration. It is the topic for his thinking, but it is not a topic to be radically doubted. Instead, Anselm is asking for a glimpse into the standard which pre-gives every thinking he undertakes. And in order to do this, he recognizes that he cannot abandon this very standard. He cannot abandon it, because his faith is what allows for all understanding to occur. His whole reality is structured by this faith. It is only natural for Anselm to think towards the consent of God. For, as the light which allows for all bearing to come- to-be, Anselm's God must luminate the open thinking of his desire to understand.
Having now attempted to call his reader forth into the particular domain of thought his thinking had encountered, Anselm must now demonstrate how this thinking can occasion a transformation in the thought of God's being.
Chapter 2 - That God Truly Exists
Anselm begins chapter two with the opening word 'Ergo' (therefore, thus). He is here signaling the connective role chapter one plays in accordance with chapter two. As such, his first move in chapter two shouldn't come as much of a surprise. His strategy begins by entering into a prayer relationship with God:
Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to faith, grant that, insofar as you know it is useful for me, I may understand that you exist as we believe you to be, and that you are what we believe you to be. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 325)
With this introductory sentence in chapter 2, two significant points come to light. One, by beginning in a communicative prayer relationship, Anselm seems to gesture towards an understanding of what his title, the Proslogion, could mean. Namely, by entering into a speech dialogue with God, Anselm seems to hint towards the fact that his 'speech towards another' (Proslogion) occurs within the mediation between Anselm and his God. But what still remains unclear at this point, is the direction by which this speech is made. Is it Anselm directing a speech towards God? Or is the Proslogion God speaking towards Anselm? Or is it both? Although an ambiguity appears to remain, a more determinate understanding seems to become apparent through this relationship. In beginning with a prayer relationship with God then, the title of Anselm's work, the Proslogion, now appears to reveal itself as a speech made, and directed within, the relationship between Anselm and his God.
And secondly, in this opening prayer, Anselm admits to the subjectivity of his thinking. He isn't claiming to seek to understand God's being as it is in itself, but rather to understand God's being according to the way in which he believes God to be. He is attempting to satisfy an understanding of a belief which is already presupposed within a particular theological interpretive context. Recall, in the concluding moments of chapter one, Anselm admits to desiring an understanding of God's being based on his belief in God's being:
I am not trying to scale your heights, Lord; my understanding is in no way equal to that. But I do long to understand your truth in some way, your truth which my heart believes and loves. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 323)
What Anselm is signaling here, is that the whole of his project in the Proslogion, is to try and understand God's being according to a particular belief in God's being which has revealed itself within a particular theological framework. And as his opening prayer admits - "grant that...I may understand that you exist as we believe you to be, and that you are what we believe you to be" - Anselm's thinking is concerned with an understanding of God's being within the particularity of this revealed horizon.
And with this initial announcement, Anselm's obvious next move is to identify the way in which God's being is believed to be within this horizon of belief. The significance of the way in which Anselm identifies this belief cannot be over-estimated. This identification of what Anselm believes his God to be sets the stage for the whole logic of the text. Without the particularity of this belief, Anselm's thoughts in the Proslogion cannot progress. So what does Anselm believe his God to be?
We believe that you are something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 325)
The meaning attached to this belief marks the fundamental structure of Anselm's domain of thinking. He believes in something which his thought can think of none 'greater'. This is the initial starting point for Anselm, and from it, he will attempt to unfold its proper understanding. Recall, Anselm's subtitle for the Proslogion was 'faith seeking understanding'. In identifying his belief as 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', Anselm has identified the immediate belief he possesses. He must now seek out an understanding of this belief.
In order to set this understanding in motion, Anselm requires a vehicle by which to make his thought movement move. Upon a close reading, the tool he chooses for motion is the language of dialectic. That is, by way of negation. Consider his next move:
So can it be that no such nature exists, since the fool has said in his heart, 'There is no God'? (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 325)
By positing the fool's claim in relationship to his own belief, Anselm has attempted to negate his initial conception. He has posited his initial belief (as 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought') in relation to a negation - the fool's challenge (that there is no such being).
However, before looking at how Anselm uses this negation to further his understanding, it is worth briefly pointing out what Anselm means by the term 'fool.' Contemporarily speaking, the 'fool' is generally associated with a person who 'lacks sense or judgment.' However, this isn't necessarily the same type of reference Anselm is considering. His conception of the term is derived from the New Testament use of the 'fool' in the book of Psalms. Therein, the sense of the term takes on a slightly different meaning. The meaning it takes on is closely tied to that of an intelligent person who in fact happens to choose poorly. That is, of a person who is capable of choosing properly, but instead chooses to act opposingly. Although many read Anselm's text today, and consider him to be associating an atheist with a dunce, this isn't what Anselm is doing. Instead, Anselm takes the charge of the 'fool' quite seriously. He is engaging himself with a person of intellectual capability.
So how does Anselm move his understanding by playing it off of this term? Consider Anselm's next step:
But when this same fool hears me say 'something-than-which-nothing-greater- can-be-thought', he surely understands what he hears; and what he understands exists in his intellect, even if he does not understand that it actually exists [in reality]. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 325)
Recall, Anselm is trying to make determinate his initial belief (fides quaerens intellectum), and his method for understanding appears to be in its attempt to mediate his thinking by way of negation. The negation he posits is the fool's challenge that 'there is no such being'. And so, in the above passage, Anselm is attempting to make clear what exactly this challenge by the 'fool' entails. According to Anselm, the challenge entails, not that there isn't a belief in 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', but rather that there is no referent to this belief. The 'fool', as a negation, entails that the belief in 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' does exist in the intellect but that it does not possess any reality outside of the intellect. At this early stage then, Anselm has committed the 'fool' to this claim.
To make clear what is meant by this distinction between existing in the intellect and existing in reality, Anselm illustrates the following example:
When a painter, for example, thinks out in advance what he is going to paint, he has it in his intellect, but he does not understand that it exists, since he has not yet painted it. But once he has painted it, he both has it in his intellect and understands that it exists because it is in the intellect. So even the fool must admit that something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought exists at least in the intellect, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood exists in the intellect. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 325)
This example re-iterates the distinction Anselm claims the 'fool' will admit. Anselm must now demonstrate that this negation (that 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought exists only in the intellect) cannot be what it takes itself to be. He must demonstrate the insufficiency that this negation possesses.
So how does Anselm achieve this? How is it that Anselm resolves this conflict in his thought? Although there is much controversy surrounding his next move, what needs to be recalled for a proper understanding of Anselm's thinking, is why it is that Anselm wants to move beyond this stage of thought.
Anselm has a conflict in his thought because the 'fool' (who is taken very seriously) presents Anselm with a crossroads for his thinking to resolve. The fool claims that Anselm's belief exists only in his intellect. But as the source of all of Anselm's understanding, this sort of a challenge confronts Anselm rather dramatically. That is, since his whole reality is structured by this belief, either his belief is misunderstood, or else this challenge must be misunderstood. As a 'belief seeking understanding 'however, Anselm doesn't move to call his belief into question, instead, decisively, he vies to call the challenge into question.
So how does he do this? He looks for a tension internal to the fool's own standpoint. And what is this tension? According to Anselm, the tension obtains within the intelligibility of the thought of 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' to be existing only within the intellect. It is a tension, because for Anselm, it is greater to exist both in the intellect and in reality:
For if it exists only in the intellect, it can be thought to exist in reality as well, which is greater. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 325)
For Anselm, since it is greater to exist both in the intellect and in reality, if 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' does not exist in reality, then there is something else which can be thought to be greater. Meaning, that if this belief in 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' does not exist in reality, it could not be 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', because the thing which none greater is being thought of must exist in reality. In basic terms, what Anselm is claiming here, is that since existence in the intellect and reality is greater than mere existence in the intellect, 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' must exist in both the intellect and in reality. Meaning that the 'fool' cannot intelligibly claim that 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' exists only in the intellect.
Quite unfortunately, it is this stage of Anselm's thinking which appears to have generated the most controversy over the many centuries. According to many of his critics, at bottom, Anselm appears to be claiming that since existence is greater than non-existence, non-existence cannot pertain to 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought - otherwise something greater could be thought, which would of course generate a contradiction in terms.
But what is commonly over-looked by many of his critics is that at this stage of his thinking, Anselm has yet to complete his thought movement. Three points clearly signal the fact that Anselm is not yet finished: (i) satisfaction of 'understanding' has yet to be announced, (ii) Anselm's prayer to God for understanding has not yet concluded, and (iii), most significantly, but seemingly always neglected, Anselm has yet to associate his concepts with God. That is, Anselm has yet to determinately claim that 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' is in fact God.
With these three considerations in mind, it is properly un-intelligible to arrest Anselm at this stage of his thinking. Although this stage may indeed appear somewhat problematical (e.g. why is existence greater than non-existence?), the critical reader must allow Anselm the opportunity to complete his intended task. Recall, his intended task is to understand God's being based on the belief he has of God's being. Before the critical reader may attack Anselm, they must grant Anselm the chance to play his intended thought attempt out. In granting Anselm this opportunity, his problematical steps may eventually become much clearer.
So what can Anselm be said to be doing here by the end of chapter two? Anselm's intent is to properly determine his belief in God's being (fides quaerens intellectum). To do this, Anselm began by identifying his belief as 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'. Once identified, he played this belief off of a negation, viz. the fool's challenge that this 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' exists only in the intellect. In playing his belief off of this term, Anselm claims that, upon deeper consideration, the 'fool' cannot intelligibly make the type of claim that it thought it made. It cannot do so, because since existence in the intellect and in reality is greater than mere existence in the intellect, 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' must possess existence in the intellect and in reality.
Based on this discovery of what the term 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' entails, Anselm makes a subtle linguistic shift to signify this transition. He determines 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' as:
that-than-which-a greater-cannot-be-thought. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 325)
The subtlety of this shift in signification is commonly overlooked, but it can serve well to properly makes sense of the thought movement Anselm is writing down. A close reading of the Proslogion should not ignore this fact. Anselm begins chapter 2 with the signification of 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', but as will be seen, he begins chapter 3 right where chapter 2 ended off, with the signification of 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'. This is a seeming shift from a weaker claim towards a stronger - from a vague indefinite, claim towards a more determinate consideration.
In chapter two then, although its decisive step may appear somewhat problematical, the move Anselm has made (by way of the 'negation' of the fool) is from an initial indeterminate belief in 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' towards a more determinate understanding of 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'. It now remains to be seen, whether Anselm can achieve his intention of understanding his belief based on the meaning of the term 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.'
Chapter 3 - That It Cannot Be Thought Not To Be
The concise precision of Anselm's thinking in chapter three is so sharp that it is perhaps no small wonder that it has been constantly overlooked by so many critics and interpreters. As if the bewilderment of chapter two doesn't leave its reader with enough to think about, Anselm continues with his penetrating thinking in chapter three. In the space of a mere twelve exacting sentences, Anselm effects one the most significant transformations in the thought of God's being within the history of Western thought.
So how does he achieve such a momentous event? The force of his logic in chapter three surrounds, and is based upon, the precision of the following claim:
For it is possible to think that something exists that cannot be thought not to be, and such a being is greater than one that can be thought not to be. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
The subtle depth of this thought is worthy of proper consideration. In this one exacting sentence, Anselm attempts a fundamental transformation in the thought of God's being. His strategy here is to continue forward with a contemplation of the understanding of his belief. His belief revealed itself initially as 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', and then began to determine itself (by way of the 'fool' as negation) as 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'. But here in chapter 3, Anselm radicalizes this thinking. He discovers something which is greater than what his thinking had discovered in chapter 2.
To make the subtlety of this discovery in chapter 3 clearer, consider the distinctions Anselm drew regarding 'being' in chapter 2. Essentially, he posited three sorts of 'being': one existed merely in the 'intellect', another existed in 'reality', and the third existed in 'both the intellect and in reality'. The logic of chapter 2 claimed, that since it is greater to exist in both the intellect and in reality, 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' must exist in both the intellect and in reality. But in chapter 3, Anselm considers a fourth category of 'being'. A fourth category which Anselm believes to be greater than the third category which was generated in chapter 2.
Chapter three then, isn't a re-iteration the contention of chapter two. Rather, it is a radicalization of it. Chapter two derives the conclusion that, since it is greater to exist in both the intellect and in reality, 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' must exist in the intellect and in reality. But Anselm's thinking isn't satisfied here - and rightfully so.
For many sorts of things satisfy this condition of existing in the intellect and in reality. For example, George W. Bush exists in the intellect and reality. There is a concept of what a George W. Bush is in the intellect, and it does in fact exist in reality. But the decisive step for Anselm's thinking is that something like a George W. Bush isn't 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'.
Light-hearted joking aside Anselm would suggest that something greater than a George W. Bush could be thought. How? Consider once again Anselm's decisive radicalization in chapter three:
For it is possible to think that something exists that cannot be thought not to be, and such a being is greater than one that can be thought not to be. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
A being is greater for Anselm, if its being is such that its non-being is impossible to be thought. To make this point clearer, consider once again the example of George W. Bush. George W. Bush exists in the intellect and in reality, but can his non-existence in reality be thought? Of course it can. In fact, it isn't very difficult to conceive of a George W. Bush, or any other human being for that matter, as not existing in reality. Bush, like other human beings, came-to-be at a certain time and place, and will eventually cease-to-be at a certain time and place. This is the nature of the human being. But in the case of 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', Anselm is suggesting that this cannot be the state of its being. As Anselm suggests, if it were possible to think of this being in such a fashion, then something greater than it could be thought.
So what is the movement Anselm's thinking attempts in chapter 3? Keeping up with his announced intentions, he is attempting to continue with his penetration into an understanding of his belief (fides quaerens intellectum). His belief initially revealed itself as 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', and then determined itself as 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' since it was greater if this something existed in both the intellect and in reality. And in continuing with an understanding of what is greater, Anselm discovered a subtle, yet decisive, following premise:
For it is possible to think that something exists that cannot be thought not to be, and such a being is greater than one that can be thought not to be. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
He discovers that a being is greater, if its non-existence cannot be conceived in the intellect or in reality. With this discovery, Anselm has now moved beyond his thinking in chapter 2. And as such, his next move is easily anticipated. He must import his thinking from the previous chapter and demonstrate its insufficiency:
Therefore, if that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought can be thought not to be, then that-than-which-a greater-cannot-be-thought is not that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought". (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
The exacting precision of Anselm's thinking here is somewhat remarkable. In pursuing this greatness criterion (which is revealed in his belief in God), Anselm discovers that this being cannot merely exist in the intellect and in reality, it must exist in the intellect and in reality in a specific sense - in such a way that it cannot be thought not to be there. As such, Anselm must negate the original meaning of the term 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'. He must negate it, because something greater than this original meaning could be thought. Namely, something which cannot be thought not to be in the intellect and in reality.
The distinction Anselm is drawing here, to use somewhat more contemporary vocabulary, is a distinction between contingent and non-contingent existence. Anselm isn't saying, like so many critics have taken him to say, that since existence is greater than non-existence, and since existence is a perfection, that God must exist. Instead, he is saying that to have being in a non-contingent sense is greater than having being in a contingent sense.
A strong impediment which stands in the way of a proper understanding of this subtle distinction, is in the sense of the word 'existence' or 'being'. In everyday use, the sense of the term carries with it the weight of contingency. That is, objects which 'exist' or have 'being' are generally thought to come-to-be and to cease-to-be. But this isn't the sense of the word Anselm is employing here in chapter 3. Although more will be said regarding this point in the final sections of this paper, Anselm's quantitative thinking of God's being, has curiously turned towards a qualitatively distinct sort of being.
So with the thought of God's being now shifted, Anselm carries through the proper next move:
So that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought exists so truly that it cannot-be-thought-not-to-be. And this is you, O Lord our God. You exist so truly, O Lord my God, that you cannot-be-thought-not-to-be. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
With the recognition of the insufficiency in the meaning attached to the name 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', Anselm effects a transition by changing the signification of the name to that which 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be'. This is Anselm's final turning in his thinking of this being. He signals this conclusion, by finally associating his thought significations with God. That is, curiously unnoticed, this is the first mention Anselm makes of associating God with his thought movement. He doesn't associate his understanding of God's being with 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', nor does he associate his understanding of God's being with 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', instead, he makes it quite clear: God's being for Anselm is that which 'cannot-be-thought not-to-be'. This is the signification Anselm gives to the meaning of God's being.
To briefly compare Anselm's thinking once again with the Allegory of the Cave, Anselm, now at the privileged vantage point, must descend back down to consider the errors of past ways of thinking:
And rightly so, for if some mind could think something better than you, a creature would rise above the Creator and sit in judgment upon him, which is completely absurd. Indeed, everything that exists, except for you alone, can be thought not to be. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
With this last sentence, Anselm re-affirms the position his thinking had just previously established - a thinking which recognizes the distinctive nature of God's being. A thinking which cannot consider God's being as contingent being. He continues:
So you alone among all things have being most truly, and therefore most greatly. Whatever else exists has being less truly, and therefore less greatly. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
Anselm is continuing with his distinction amongst beings. For Anselm's understanding, God's being is that unique sort of being which 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be'. This is the standpoint he has arrived at in his thinking. His thinking of God's being has left him with the thought that God's being is such that it 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be'.
But Anselm's thinking refuses to finish here. How is this noted? It is noted based on the fact that he hasn't yet finished his prayer. He hasn't yet thanked his God for this permitting of understanding. At this stage, something still remains for Anselm to understand.
So what is his next step? Since God's being is that which 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be', Anselm indeed has a thought conflict still to be resolved. Namely, if God 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be' how is it possible that the 'fool' claims that God does not have being? Or in other words, if God 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be' then how is it possible that the 'fool' claims to think that God is not? Anselm makes room for this consideration in chapter 4, by ending chapter 3 in the following fashion:
So then why did the fool say in his heart, 'There is no God,' when it is so evident to a rational (ratio) mind that you among all beings exist most greatly? Why indeed, unless because he is stupid and a fool? (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 327)
Anselm ends chapter 3, not with a condescending rhetorical remark, but rather with a question that his thinking desires for an answer.
Chapter 4 - How The Fool Said In His Heart What Cannot Be Thought
With this new understanding of God's being, as that which 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be', Anselm's thinking must respond to a thought experience which runs counter to this conclusion, viz. those who claim God can be thought not to be. Anselm begins chapter 4 by re-affirming this problem faced by his thinking:
But how has [the fool] said in his heart what he could not think? Or how could he not think what he said in his heart, since to say in one's heart is the same as to think? (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 329)
Anselm's understanding of God's being is such that he cannot think of God's being as not being, yet he can think of those who claim that God can be thought not to be. Based on his new understanding, he must now demonstrate how this latter claim is in some sense insufficient:
But if he truly - or rather, since he truly - thought this, because he said it in his heart, and did not say it in his heart because he could not think it something is not said in the heart or thought in only one way. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 329)
Anselm is here preparing the way for an introduction to a distinction in the ways in which thinking can take place. The distinction he introduces is as follows:
For in one sense, a thing is thought when the word signifying it is thought; in another sense when that which the thing itself is is understood. (Anselm, Schufrieder's transl., 329)
Anselm is here, not distinguishing between thinking and not thinking. Recall, Anselm takes the fool to be a thinker of intellectual capability - he takes the 'fool's thoughts very seriously. Rather, he is making a more sophisticated distinction between two ways in which one and the same thing can be thought. He is drawing attention to the difference between thinking a thing by means of the sign that signifies it, or by thinking the same thing by means of the thing itself. In the former sense, thinking does not attempt to 'stand-under' the signification. It remains on the surface of the sign, and rests content with the signifier as representative of the thing. But in the second sense, thinking attempts to 'stand-under' the sign. It stands in such a way as to delve deeper towards what the thing itself is. Both senses think about the same thing, but according to Anselm, only the latter sense is a proper attempt to 'under-stand' what the thing itself is absent of its signification. As such, Anselm states:
God can be thought not to exist in the first sense, but not at all in the second sense. No one who understands what a God is can think that God does not exist, although he may sound these words in his heart with no signification at all, or with some foreign signification. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 329)
In understanding the signification of God, i.e. as what the thing itself is, Anselm claims that this understanding makes it such that this being 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be'. By whatever way this being is thought, or by whatever name this being is given, it cannot properly be said to be understood if it is thought to be not:
For God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Whoever understands this properly, understands that this being exists in such a way that it cannot, even in thought, fail to be. So whoever understood that God exists in this way cannot think that God does not exist. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 329)
Anselm is re-establishing his earlier thinking which attempted to understand God's being. In its attempt, Anselm believed to have demonstrated that a 'proper understanding' of God's being entailed the thought that it could not be thought not to be. As such, having made the distinction between a thinking which attempts to understand the thing it is thinking about directly, from a thinking which accesses that thing indirectly, Anselm can now make sense of his thinking of God's being as that which 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be', because his thinking attempted to stand in such a way which accessed what was under the sign - the thing itself.
With a resting spot for his thinking now reached, Anselm must now properly finish and complete the thinking which had originated in prayer. He must thank his God, whose light it was that allowed for this uncovering:
Thanks be to you, my good Lord, thanks be to you. For what I once believed through your grace, I now understand through your illumination, so that even if I did not want to believe that you exist, I could not fail to understand that you exist. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 329)
With these thanks, Anselm concludes chapter 4. He thanks God's being, because Anselm's prayer had asked God's being for its assistance in his understanding. As a 'faith seeking understanding', Anselm has announced that his intent has been achieved. He began with his belief, and his thinking moved in such a way as to understand the meaning of this belief. From belief to understanding, Anselm's thinking of God's being is now grateful.
Chapters 5 -26
In the Preface of his Proslogion, Anselm told his reader the following:
Thinking that what I had rejoiced to discover would please a reader if it were written down, I wrote about it and about a number of other things in the work that follows. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 313)
With his prayer now finished at the end of chapter 4, the transition between chapter's 4 and 5 appears to mark the shift between Anselm's 'discovery' and its above remarked corollaries. As such, chapter 5 beings with the opening question: 'Then what are you, Lord God'. From this question, Anselm's thinking moves towards unfolding the essential categories of the being whom there is none greater for his thinking. Of these categories, Anselm considers the commensurability of varying properties such as happiness, corporeality, mercifulness, justness and goodness.
But what is commonly unnoticed however, with the exception of only a few insightful commentaries, is the rich value of the thoughts Anselm propounded in these chapters. Many of the references Anselm makes in these chapters, contribute to a proper understanding of the thinking Anselm generated in chapters 2 - 4.
In chapters 13, 20 and 22, for example, Anselm makes very clear reference to the qualitatively distinct sort of being Anselm understands God's being to be:
Since nothing is greater than you, you are not confined to space and time; you exist everywhere and always...you alone of all beings do not cease to be, just as you do not begin to be. (Chapt. 13) (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 345)
You are before and beyond all beings...they can be thought to have an end, whereas you cannot at all. They do in one sense have an end, but you do not in any sense. (Chapter 20) (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 359)
You are the one who exists in a strict and unqualified sense, because you can have no past and no future but only a present, and you cannot be thought not to be at any time. (Chapter 22) (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 361)
If there is any doubt that Anselm's thinking was concerned with a distinctive sort of being, reference only has to be made to these particular passages. Anselm is quite clear to suggest that God exists in a "strict and unqualified sense," that God does not exist like other beings, since other beings "can be thought to have an end." Once again, the problematic involved in recognizing this distinction seems to fall within the scope of the meaning of 'existence.' The term itself seemingly carries with it the weight of 'contingency.' But this isn't what Anselm is claiming to be the case with God's being. God doesn't exist in this sense at all. For Anselm, God cannot exist in this sense, because this form of existence does not match up with an understanding of what a God is. Although Anselm is still using the words "being" and "existence," the sense of these terms unfortunately carry with them a distinctive sense in the case of God's being. It isn't as though Anselm is "somewhat unclear" about this point, Anselm recognized it, and pointed towards it in these later chapters of the Proslogion.
There are also three other chapters in the Proslogion (15, 16, 26) whose content is worthy of serious consideration. With the exception of chapter 3, of all the chapters in the Proslogion, the peculiar nature of chapter 15 perhaps possesses the most curiosity. Consider the entirety of the mere three sentences within this chapter:
Therefore, Lord, you are not merely that than which a greater cannot be thought; you are something greater than can be thought. For since it is possible to think that such a being exists, then if you are not that being, it is possible to think something greater than you. But that is impossible. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 349)
The peculiarity of this passage has left many commentators with a perplexing puzzle: is it in fact possible to think a being which is greater than thought, or is this what Anselm means by 'impossibility?' The puzzling nature of this state of affairs has made it such that many commentators and textbook anthologies have avoided proper consideration of this chapter. However, the chain of Anselm's thinking can make sense within the context of both chapters 14 and 16. As evidence, chapter 15 begins with a "therefore." This "therefore" would appear to signal a conjunction between the thoughts of chapter 14 and 15. So what is he thinking in chapter 14? In chapter 14, Anselm gestures towards a thinking which strives to see more than what his thinking had already accomplished:
O Lord my God...tell my longing soul what you are besides what it has seen, that it might see purely what it longs to see. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 347)
However, Anselm recognizes that this thinking which strives to see more becomes obscured:
It strives to see more, but beyond what it has already seen it sees nothing but darkness. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 347)
This recognition leads Anselm to the following question:
Why is this, Lord, why is this? (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 347)
In response to his query, Anselm turns back to a recognition of his being
Indeed [my mind] is obscured by its own littleness and overwhelmed by your vastness. Truly it is pinched by its own narrowness and vanquished by your fullness...Truly it is more than any creature can understand. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 347)
With this final sentence, Anselm concludes chapter 14 and moves towards the above thinking presented in chapter 15. What Anselm has recognized here, is that a mystery remains in his thought of God's being. That is, Anselm's understanding of God's being remains in its finitude. His thinking in chapter 15 represents the carrying out of this recognition. It represents the recognition that there are still many aspects that his thinking cannot understand. Although Anselm claims that certain aspects of God's being have been understood, his thinking also recognizes that there remains many aspects which his thinking cannot penetrate.
Based on these thoughts in chapter 15, Anselm continues in chapter 16 with a marvelous metaphor which contributes to the intentional stance of Anselm's thinking. He begins with a re-iteration of the theme he generated for his reader's thinking in the Preface. He re-iterates the biblical passage from Timothy:
Truly, Lord, this is the inaccessible light in which you dwell. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 351)
Anselm approached this 'light' in his previous chapters, but now recognizes his obedience to it. He has recognized that much of its "fullness" escapes the abilities of his thinking.
For surely there is no other being that can penetrate this light so that it might see you there. Indeed, the reason that I do not see you is that it is too much for me. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 351)
Anselm has grasped certain aspects of this light which his faith was seeking to understand, but much of this light remains misunderstood:
And yet whatever I do see, I see through it, just as a weak eye sees what it sees by the light of the sun, although it cannot look at that light directly in the sun itself. My understanding cannot see that light. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 351)
Greatly reminiscent of the Platonic Simile of the Sun in Book VI of the Republic Anselm remains within an amazement of the mystery of this light. His thinking cannot grasp the completeness of this light - its completeness is inaccessible. Due to Anselm's own being, the being of this light cannot reveal itself in its full and proper un-concealment:
In you I move and in you I have my being, and yet I cannot come into your presence. You are within me and all around me, and yet I do not perceive you. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 351)
With this sentence, Anselm concludes his thinking in chapter 16. His thinking throughout the Proslogion was an attempt to approach the light which his faith had believed in. He wanted to make this light present, to grasp it in its fullness. But in his journey towards it, only certain aspects of this 'light' were revealed. The complete understanding of this being remains in its hidden mystery.
But for Anselm's thinking, the limited disclosure of this revealing is satisfactory. Anselm's thinking found its resting spot in the thought of God's being, and it remained quite content in this dwelling. As evidence, in the concluding chapter of the Proslogion, Anselm announces the "joy" his thinking possesses. The great significance of this chapter is in its distinction from many other concluding moments of philosophical works within the Western intellectual tradition. That is, unlike Anselm's conclusion, very seldom is it the case that within the history of Western philosophy, do thinkers express a "joy" or happiness in the presentation of their thinking.
Anselm however, feels the joy and happiness of his thinking, and thus, properly ends his Proslogion with an expression of this satisfaction:
For I have found a joy that is full and more than full...Let the knowledge of you grow in me here, and there let it be full. Let your love grow in me here, and there let it be full, so that my joy here is great in hope...let my mind ponder on it, my tongue speak of it. Let my heart love it and my mouth proclaim it. Let my soul hunger for it, my flesh thirst for it, my whole being long for it....blessed forever. Amen. (Anselm, Schufreider's transl., 375)
With these concluding lines, Anselm ends the thinking which has been written down in his Proslogion. For him, a 'joy' has now been embraced by his hope. He has finished pouring his thoughts out in words, and has left it to his readers to engage themselves with such an attempt.
Evaluation Recommendation
So what can be said in evaluation of Anselm's thinking? Although much of the above commentary was an attempt to meet Anselm at the level of his thinking, there is still much more to be said by way of oppositional critical engagement. This was an attempt to preserve Anselm's rightful thinking as his own, but it has yet to properly oppose Anselm on these terms. As previously mentioned however, this paper considers itself but a mere stepping-stone in the effort to understand the richness of Anselm's thinking. It is the hope of this present commentary that critical engagement may ensue on these terms presented.
There is however, one significant curiosity not yet mentioned which may lend itself quite well to proper critical engagement with Anselm's thinking. It is closely related to the many familiar criticisms which have launched themselves against the (so-called) 'ontological argument for the existence of God.' It is a criticism which was briefly alluded to earlier, and it regards the thought of 'being.' This sort of criticism has commonly been attributed to Kant, although Pierre Gassendi made a considerably similar attempt in response to Descartes some 100 years prior to Kant. At a brief glance, the original criticism charged that any proponent of the type of thinking Anselm is offering, cannot properly claim to attach 'being' to the concept of God, since being is "obviously, not a real predicate." Although there is much strength to this criticism, its aim is often misdirected in the case of criticizing Anselm. Anselm indeed has difficulty claiming to have thought 'being,' however the reasons for this difficulty aren't because of the reasons often attributed to him.
In order to demonstrate the proper way in which such a criticism should aim itself, consider the following 'brief run-down' of Anselm's thinking in chapters 2 and 3. A fitting model for 'quickly' understanding Anselm's project, is what can be called "Anselm's ladder of being." Recall, Anselm wants to understand God's being - he wants to understand what, and if, his belief in God is. To do this, Anselm must have a concept of what 'being' or 'existence' means. This Anselm does in chapter 2. He identifies three sorts of being, there is being which is merely in the 'intellect,' there is being which is in 'reality,' and there is being which obtains in 'both.' In chapter two, the greatest of these beings is that which has being in both. But in chapter three, he recognizes an even greater being. That is, the being which 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be' in both the 'intellect' and in 'reality.' This being is to be distinguished from the being of chapter 2, which Anselm claimed to 'be', both in the 'intellect' and in 'reality.' It is to be distinguished, because many beings can be thought to be in the intellect and reality (e.g. George W. Bush), but this does not mean they correspond to the being of 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.' For Anselm, God's being must be greater, because unlike this other type of being, God's being 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be' in the intellect or in reality.
So why should this be considered 'Anselm's ladder of being,' and what is it that critical engagement should look to? It is a 'ladder' of being, because Anselm moves through, from the bottom up, towards God's being. To use more contemporary vocabulary once again, Anselm demonstrates the non-contingency of God's being, only by first going through the stages of being in its contingent sense. He cannot simply begin with non-contingent being. To begin in such a fashion, would presuppose what contingent being in fact entailed. He must instead go through the steps of contingent being (chp. 2), in order to demonstrate that at the top, God's being cannot be thought to be in this contingent being (chp. 3).
Now although this 'ladder' model is being forced here upon the Proslogion (Anselm says nothing anywhere about a 'ladder of being'), it can serve well as a 'quick template' for reference in reading Anselm's thoughts of being. And what it is that is peculiar about Anselm's thought of being in the case of God's being, is that his thought of God's being indeed possesses a seemingly problematical aspect. But it is not problematical for the reasons often given by the supporters of the Gassendi and Kantian tradition. For them, the thought of 'being' is problematical, because they claim 'being' is an empty concept due to its failure in proper use of predication. But their reasons for doing so fails to consider the qualitative dissection of being which Anselm's understanding proposes. Indeed, in the case of the Kantian criticism, Anselm would very likely suggest that the being of God is quite different from the being of a "hundred thalers," since Anselm's thought of God's being is distinct from other sorts of beings.
What many critics seem to have failed to acknowledge then, is that the decisive move for Anselm's thinking isn't that, 'being is greater than not being' (and thus a property of perfection), but rather that 'being which cannot-be-thought-not-to-be is greater than being which can be thought not to be.'
In any event, what critical engagement should look towards in Anselm's thinking is that in his thought of God's distinctive being, Anselm still does not possess a positive concept. Not because, as many suggest, 'being isn't a real predicate.' But, rather, because he has understood God's being in terms of negation. He has understood God's being in terms of what God cannot not be. In the thought of God as that which 'cannot-be-thought-not-to-be,' the problem becomes: what in fact is being thought here? Since Anselm has thought God's being negatively, he is committed to saying that he is in fact thinking 'nothing.' In understanding God's being in terms of what it cannot not be, Anselm's thought is indeed an empty concept. Not because 'being isn't a real predicate,' but because Anselm's thought of God's being is in terms of nothing. It is in terms of 'nothing,' because it is understood in terms of what it is not.
Just because it cannot be thought not to be, does not entail that it must be. All that it means is that it cannot be thought not to be - which is in fact still an empty concept. Anselm seems to presuppose that this thought of nothing is the being of God. Seemingly then, the reason why Anselm cannot think God as not being, is because he cannot think God's being at all - he instead thinks nothing.
This is the sort of critical questioning which should be introduced against Anselm's thinking. Not that 'being isn't a real predicate,' but rather, a questioning that asks whether or not Anselm is justified in associating God's being with the thought of Nothing.
In any event, Anselm's penetrative thinking in his Proslogion should not be ignored. It is an integral piece to the framework known as the Western philosophical tradition. Whether his legacy can still contribute today remains to be seen. Fortunately, since dialogue is living in character, the last word can yet to have been said. In either event though, what seemingly remains clear is that Anselm took great comfort in this thought of nothing. As he expressed in chapter's 14-16, his thinking did recognize that a mystery remained. And for Anselm, even within this mystery, his hope still carried much 'joy.' From belief towards understanding, and from wonder towards the nothing, Anselm embraced and took comfort within, the 'inaccessible light' which his thinking had encountered, sought out, and adopted to be his own.
Bibliography
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